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Does wickedness or amoralism (or both) pose an insurmountable challenge to internalism?
In the study of moral philosophy, or rather, the metaethical study thereof, exist conflicting ideas regarding the motivation and drive towards morality. This debate can be split into the camps of internalism and externalism. The former, internalism, is more commonly accepted than its counterpart, being a foundational a priori assumption for several modes of ethical thought, but externalism is not without its own compelling counterarguments. One such possible counter that can shake the steady footing of the internalist position is the question pertaining to the amoral and the wicked among us. Wickedness is a somewhat charged concept, even on a linguistic basis, but amoralism, and the amoralist, make for fascinating subjects in this debate. Evil is generally a common feature in many discussions of ethics, which provide their own explanations for such phenomena, but sheer moral apathy and disinterest seem to confound the internalist position.
In order to fully discuss this topic, it would be beneficial to first define the necessary concepts. Let us begin with the defending party: Internalism. Internalism stems from the belief that moral judgements, necessarily by their nature, act as motivators. It is, according to the internalist, impossible on even a conceptual level to make a moral judgement, and yet fail to be motivated. (Fisher, 2011) This is also why wickedness may fail as a defeating factor, as an action is motivated by the judgement, it is simply that the action takes the negative side of the judgement, rather than the potential amoralist, who ignores the judgement altogether. Nonetheless, internalism holds that if one, for instance, sees a person in distress on the street, they shall be compelled to help. This ideal has varying degrees of intensity within the ideology of internalism, with what could be referred to as a strong internalist stating that it is literally impossible, on any level, for one not to act upon a moral impulse, utterly disqualifying the possibility of an amoralist (Rosati, 2016). Conversely, in the case of supposed weak internalism , an agent may not act upon a moral impulse, perhaps due to a conflict of interests, or a lacking ability to call upon the faculties of reason (exemplified, for instance, by some mental condition, which hinders these very faculties, or otherwise clouds them.). This means that only those possessing of an adequate degree of will, reason, and moral drive already will act upon such impulses, which opens the doors to the possibility of an agent who makes a moral judgement, but receives no stimulus nor motivation from it. As such, this is the position suited to combating the problem posed by the hypothetical amoralist. Though of course, a shift towards the alternative extreme of externalism would also resolve this problem.
The next step of this process of definition then takes us to the term amoralist . What, precisely, is this hypothetical individual who disrupts the theory of internalism to such a degree? In summary, an amoralist is a person who, like any other, forms, receives and acknowledges moral judgements, but more uniquely, is entirely unmotivated by these stimuli. They are not incapable, through some deficiency or condition, of moral judgement, but instead, they are entirely unmoved by them. In the case of the aforementioned strong internalism, such a lapse need only occur on a singular occasion to be classified as amoralism. But such a concept of internalism, theoretically, utterly excludes the possibility of the existence of the amoralist, so as such, the suggestion of this may leave the theory in a spot of trouble. To exemplify amoralism, let us take our earlier example. Ordinarily, by the reckoning of the internalist, a person passing someone in distress, let us say in a state of medical emergency, upon the street would be compelled to help them. But an amoralist, meanwhile, would acknowledge the situation, and the action they morally ought to take, but rather than acting upon this impulse, or actively going against it, they simply would not pay any mind to it. This subconscious lack of an impulse to act is precisely what characterizes an amoral act, and in the case of strong internalism, an amoralist.
Then how can internalism respond to this quandary, which lacks in a moral drive? What can make the amoralist act morally? Perhaps the amoralist is acting in a manner which is purely self-serving, rather than abiding by morality, and so see no reason to follow such impulses. Perhaps then, it could be argued that in fact, what the amoralist experiences is not, in fact, truly a sense of morality? After all, if by definition, one who experiences a moral judgement cannot help but act upon it, how can someone who does not act upon it be truly said to be experiencing moral judgements in any normal, conventional sense? (Brink, 1997) It is not the case that the amoralist is indifferent to all moral standards, as it may be perceived by others, bur rather, by some quirk of character or psychology, this supposed amoralist is instead operating based upon a unique and personal view of morality, which does not necessitate action in all the same situations. Then, taking a sentimentalist stance, if we assume that the amoralists view of morality refers only to matters of approval and disapproval, the system of moral judgement becomes entirely different to the one which internalism builds itself upon, and so, the amoralists perceived moral failures are only their own, and cannot be attributed to internalism. It is not, as far as an internalist is concerned, a real moral judgement.
An alternate internalist response may take more of a realist, virtue ethics-grounded approach to the conundrum in question, and instead hypothesise that an amoralist takes a purely psychological view of moral situations, seeing them through a purely cognitive lens, but being unable to truly parse nor act on them, as the amoralist is simply not a virtuous person, be they inherently possessing of such a disposition, or merely lacking in sufficient moral education towards that end. (Svavarsdottir, 1999)
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