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The rapid spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in early 2003 was accepted by a number of governments as a challenge to their national security because of its adverse effects on their economies, including their hospital systems.The SARS epidemic is one of the beneficial case study for evaluating national and international capabilities to deal with disease outbreaks, both naturally occurring and deliberate. This appendix examines the course, impact and important of the epidemic, including the lessons learned regarding the planning for and response to both naturally occurring and intentionally inflicted disease, describes the emergence of SARS and the international fight against it, with particular the role of the World Health Organization (WHO).
Section II of this appendix notes some unanswered questions about SARS, including the possibility of further outbreaks. Discusses the broader problems and costs entailed by such epidemics and the general case for better preparedness against them.Identifies some lessons from the SARS episode which may be useful in this context, covering global cooperation, preparedness planning and public information policy, discusses the possible use of SARS and other infectious diseases as biological weapons and the relevance of the BTWC. At last told about the conclusions.3
The role of the WHO and other organizations
The WHO International Health Regulations provide the legal background for global surveillance and reporting of infectious diseases and a mechanism by which measures to prevent the international spread of disease can be enforced. Possible further revisions of these regulations are being discussed at the WHO.
The novel nature of the SARS virus complicated efforts to contain the disease. Researchers had to identify and characterize the causative agent in order to be able to develop a diagnostic test, treatment protocols and a scientifically sound basis for recommending control measures.
WHO have given the instructions to Stop the spread of SARS by isolating infected individuals and those who had been in contact with them initially offered the only hope of containing and eliminating the virus. Controlling peoples motion and providing facilities and hospitals are difficult in any country, and this is very accurate for economically unstable countries. Separating the victims of SARS and their contacts nevertheless provided the most effective means of control. The WHO information circulars and travel advisories also mainly assisted in the control of the disease. conformation the onset of a disease in a very early step is a necessary by creating a vaccine and establishing and adopting diagnostic methods and techniques. In experiments conducted at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, scientists infected monkeys with the coronavirus that is suspected of causing SARS, and which was first separating by Hong Kong University on 27 March 2003. On 16 April, within a month of its establishment, the laboratory staffs announced conclusive identification of the SARS causative agent: a new coronavirus, unlike any other known human or animal virus in its family. The test animals developed the same symptoms of the disease as those developed by humans, and this confirmed the identity of the virus that causes SARS. In May 2003, scientists announced the first results of studies on the life span of the SARS virus in different environmental conditions and in various bodily specimens, including feces, respiratory secretions and urine.
Scientists at Canadas British Columbia Cancer Agencys Genome Sciences Centre fulfilled sequencing of the genome of the SARS virus in time duration of one week on 12 April 2003. This help in diagnosis, which was previously done by the process of elimination, Speedy diagnosis and the genome map will assist in providing the basis for identifying possible mutations.
Daily teleconferences of epidemiologists, including WHO team members, from major outbreak disease led to refined case definitions, facilitated daily reporting, exact modes of transmission, tracked exported cases and highly increased the understanding of the control measures that worked best in various country.
The WHO also sent teams of epidemiologists and other specialists to explore environmental sources of infection and to discuss with authorities about the conditions by which the initial reports of SARS might have emerged.
The first international consultative meeting on the global epidemiology of SARS provide a comprehensive document on the status of current knowledge to give strong policy recommendations to restrain and control. Participants of the debate described the clinical course of SARS, compared and contrast different treatments results, recommended guidelines for isolation and infection control, and investigate possible ways for the rapid recovery of many patients and the rapid damage of others as well as for the very small number of pediatric cases. The experience got from the SARS epidemic has demonstrated that, with strong global leadership, scientific experts from the whole world can work in an effective collaborative manner to identify and contain novel pathogens. The WHO arranged broadly restrain campaign that prevented SARS from becoming a widely threat. The scientific priorities contain the development of a reliable diagnostic test, improved understanding of the modes of transmission and identification of effective treatment regimes. The influenza network was used as a model for the SARS laboratory system, suggesting that such an approach contributes with highly rapid as well as efficiency.
Chart of seasonality of respiratory virus infection in mild areas. Respirational viruses are categorized in three groups according to their seasonal epidemics.Influenzavirus, human coronavirus (HCoV) (such as strains OC43,HKU1,229E,and NL63),and human respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) show peaks in winter (winter viruses).Adenovirus, humanbocavirus (HBoV),parainfluenza virus (PIV),human metapneumovirus (hMPV),and rhinovirus can be detected throughout the year (all-year viruses).Seasonal patterns of PIV are type specific. Epidemics of PIV type 1 (PIV1) and PIV type 3 (PIV3) peak in the fall and spring-summer,respectively.The prevalence of some non-rhinovirus enteroviruses increases in summer (summer viruses).
In other Study viral agent divide in to three groups Based on their similarity and seasonality. Enveloped viruses, Non enveloped viruses and Enveloped viruses with preference for warmer temperatures.
Non enveloped viruses; Rhinovirus and adenovirus Which are present all of the year. Enveloped viruses with winter majority (RSV,HMPV,IAV, and IBV).
Generalized Rectilinear Models. Thegeneralized linear models were made to prove the seasonality of each virus. Using temperature as a evaluation meteorological reason, the maximum point in the waveform for each virus is the time of year where they are most active in the population .Enveloped viruses in the winter. RSV 17th of December, IAV 12th of January, IBV 8th of February; HMPV 11th of March 4b: Non-enveloped viruses. Adenovirus 5th of March, Rhinovirus 6th of November; 4c: Human parainfluenza viruses. HPIV-131st of October, HPIV-215th of November, HPIV-34th of May.Inthis study, non-enveloped agents are existing year-round with some seasonal difference. Adenovirus is identified to be stable at high humidity levels (80%). Since this is very close to the mean humidity for the study period (81%), this could explain the presence of adenovirus throughout the year. Davis GW showed that adenovirus survival is better at elevated humidity levels (89%) than at lesser humidity (50%)20. The peak in March originate in our GLM for adenoviruses is different to the December peaks observed for enteric adenoviruses in Japan, though a peak in the winter months is got when GLM was drawn for 2011, a year when visual peaks for all viruses were present. Our results show that adenoviruses prefer temperatures around 9 °C. The inverse relationship among adenoviruses and temperature, documented by the minor OR, is in keeping with the report from Germany.
References
- Chang W. L., Yeung K. H., Leung Y. K. Climate, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Avian Flu. WMO Bull. 2005;54(4):1-9.
- WHO Scientific Research Advisory Committee on Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). 2003;(October).
- Who. WHO Scientific Research Advisory Committee on Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). October. 2003;(October). http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCIQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.who.int%2Fcsr%2Fresources%2Fpublications%2Fen%2FSRAC-CDSCSRGAR2004_16.pdf&ei=NyEvTdruMpDQjAfv_pyEBQ&usg=AFQjCNGopYJ5jogaXwsTLtiRoog1vHiENA.
- Bulletin WMO. Reprint 611 Climate , Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ( SARS ) and Avian Flu W . L . Chang , K . H . Yeung & Y . K . Leung. 2005;54(4).
- Price RHM, Graham C, Ramalingam S. Association between viral seasonality and meteorological factors. Sci Rep. 2019;9(1):1-11. doi:10.1038/s41598-018-37481-y
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