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Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr, an Orthodox historian, predominantly holds Russia responsible for the cause of The Cold War. When measuring the causes, he argues that it is vital to highlight Russia’s sense of insecurity which led to an aggressive adherence to Leninist ideology and a troublesome view of world order that involved sharp contradictions. The Russian leaders stubbornly held the sphere of influence view, in which each great power would be assured by the other powers of an acknowledged predominance in its own area of special interest, in this case, national security would be ensured through the balance of power. This idea directly clashed with the USA’s universalist approach, where all nations shared a common interest in the global affairs, national security would then be guaranteed by an international organization. Schlesinger was strongly in favour of the universalist approach as he believed the former was inherently unstable and could potentially lead to another war. The stubborn Soviets refused to consider America’s alternative, Schlesinger credits this to the widespread insecurity in Russia at the time. Russia had repeatedly been victim to invasions throughout history, which required them to protect their western borders that lacked a natural means of defence. Therefore, their expansionist view could be seen by some (George Kennan) as just a means of survival and security. However, Schlesinger is unable to see their personal insecurity as a reasonable explanation for their actions. He claims that the USA were willing to compromise with Russia because they understood the Soviets need for security, but the USSR’s inability to compromise led to the common belief that the Russians expansionist tactics were of ill-intent.
Schlesinger highlights another cause indispensable to understanding the origins of The Cold War, Stalin’s character. He holds the belief that Stalin’s behavioural traits and excessive paranoia’, ascribed to the suicide of his wife, largely impacted the relations between the Soviet Union and the Western allies. Lenin had previously criticized his rude and arbitrary ways and it is stated that even Khrushchev, Stalin’s successor, believed that he saw enemies everywhere and in everything. It increased tensions between the allies as Stalin believed that the US was planning a separate surrender of the German armies after the defeat of Japan and the Nazi’s. His paranoia also became increasingly apparent in the years of the Great Purge (1936-38) where those opposing the communist regime suffered severe punishment such as execution. Schlesinger argues that there was absolutely nothing America could do to appease Stalin. He also considers the death of Roosevelt in the causes of The Cold War. Roosevelt was able to somewhat influence and restrain Stalin in ways which others had failed to do so; this is evident in the Soviet Acquiescence at the Yalta conference. Roosevelt’s approach largely contrasted with Truman’s hostile policies which pressurized Moscow to take measures in defence of their borders. However, Schlesinger argues that Truman’s approach was a reaction to Russia’s aggression, rather than an action in itself.
In addition to this, Schlesinger asserts that Russia’s unilateral approach in Eastern Europe further succeeded in exacerbating relations between the USSR and the Western allies. They ignored the Declaration on Liberated Europe, the Atlantic Charter, and the post-war idea of self-determination and human freedom which the Americans thought was essential to maintain stable peace. Furthermore, the differing ideologies of capitalism and communism made the likelihood of hostility inevitable. Schlesinger places the majority of the blame on the communist ideology. He claims that America’s position as the leading capitalist power naturally made them a threat to the Soviet Union no matter what Roosevelt or Truman did. Lenin wrote, as long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live at peace. Schlesinger claims that Russia was indoctrinated by Marxism which fuelled their belief that the capitalist West were out to destroy them, when in actuality, America wanted a peaceful post-war collaboration. Therefore, according to Schlesinger, The Cold War was destined to occur and there was nothing the USA could have done that would abolish the mistrust the USSR had felt for their ideological rivals.
On the other hand, Alperovitz, a revisionist historian, strongly opposes the Orthodox view and argues that American policy was the overriding factor that caused tensions and eventually led to The Cold War. He claims that the atomic bomb significantly influenced the views of American policymakers as it provided them with profound confidence and confirmed the belief that they had the ability to affect developments in the Soviet Union. This is evident through Truman’s statement where he confesses that the bomb gave him an entirely new feeling of confidence. His assurance is further demonstrated through the unyielding demands made at Potsdam, which directly contrasted with Roosevelt’s accommodating approach at Yalta. Due to this, it could be argued, with certainty, that without the development of the atomic bomb it was improbable that the Western allies could force the Soviet Union to cooperate.
As a result of the weapon’s development and the death of Roosevelt, Alperovitz argues that the USA deliberately abandoned the wartime policy of collaboration, which further soured relations between the powers. Truman’s inability to adhere to the Yalta reparation accord, his opposition in the Balkans, and his decision to cut off Lend-Lease, emphasized the dichotomy between himself and Roosevelt. Alperovitz view is similar to that of Stimson who argued that the USA’s abrupt opposition to the Soviet Union would increase their suspicions and distrust of our purposes. Truman’s radical policy and tactic of intimidation failed to appease the exceptionally insecure Soviet Union, leaving them with no other alternative but to take defensive measures.
Furthermore, Alperovitz claims the use of the bomb was a political decision made under the guise of military consideration to help the USA regain the lead and prevent Soviet domination. Truman’s argument that the weapon saved millions of lives directly contrasts with Eisenhower who argued it was completely unnecessary as Japan was close to defeat. Alperovitz suggests that the USA had a vested interest in Asia and wanted to end all hostilities before the Red Army had a chance to attack and seize Manchuria. However, Truman feared that initiating negotiations with Japan would be too time-consuming and would provide Russia with an opportunity to establish themselves in the East. Additionally, another reason for the detonation of the bomb was the idea that it would impress the Russians and convince them to accept a peace plan intending to limit the power of the USSR, making them more manageable in Europe.
Contrastingly, the approach of the post-revisionist historian, J. L. Gaddis, synthesizes both orthodox and revisionist interpretations on the origins of The Cold War. He firmly held the belief that neither side can bear sole responsibility for the onset of the war and criticizes revisionist interpretations for not considering the role of the Soviet Union. Whilst both, the USA and the USSR, agreed-upon unconditional surrender and disarming defeated enemies, their ultimate views were not congruent due to their contrasting past experiences. The future of Eastern Europe and Germany became areas of contention, as Stalin believed the key to peace was to keep Russia strong, and Germany weak. He did not agree with the USA’s hope for self-determination in Eastern Europe as the area was vital to Soviet security. Gaddis claims that Russia’ views were misinterpreted as threatening, to the USA, due to their ideology which centred around the destruction of capitalism. Although Stalin took little interest in promoting the fortunes of communist parties, his failure to make his intentions clear, led American policymakers to mistake Stalin’s aim to ensure Russia’s security, as an attempt to spread communism.
In addition to this, Gaddis also suggests that the USA’s monopoly over the atomic bomb provided them with newfound confidence. America’s advancement in technology led them to believe that they had the ability to shape post-war order to their liking, and Russia had no choice but to comply. The USA was adamant for Russia to make concessions in exchange for post-war loans. However, when the USSR turned to German reparations for their finances, the American policymakers launched a program of economic assistance to nations threatened by communism. Thus, revealing, to the USSR, that America would not back down against communist expansion, even at the risk of war. Gaddis also suggests that American policymakers hyperbolized the threat of Soviet expansion to gain support against the USSR. Therefore, indicating that Russia was not as hazardous as they were made out to be.
However, Gaddis also places an emphasis on the internal constraints placed upon American policymakers due to their domestic politics. Many suggest that the USA could have allayed Soviet distrust by voluntarily relinquishing its monopolies over the atomic bomb. Gaddis argues against this, as he believes it would have only succeeded in alienating the American public. Similarly, the USA’s economic concession to Russia, in the form of loans, would have also estranged congress as they still held an isolationist view towards foreign aid. Gaddis suggests that the USA’s nonrecognition of Moscow’s sphere of influence in Eastern Europe was due to the belief that the survival of capitalism was solely dependent upon the expansion of American economic influence overseas. Communism had directly threatened this, hence why its suppression was mandatory. Gaddis emphasizes that if one must assign responsibility, Russia is to be held accountable for The Cold War. He argues that the Russians had a larger selection of alternatives in comparison to the USA. Stalin was immune to pressures of Congress, public opinion and the press, which provided him with the ability to overcome internal restraints on his policy, unlike America. Furthermore, Gaddis also identifies Stalin’s paranoia as a reason for the sour relations between the USSR and the West. It is suggested that the Soviet Union had no intention of reconciling with the USA, there was great suspicion and no trust in the relationship between the two powers, which exacerbated matters.
There are multiple reasons why each historian has differing interpretations on the causes of The Cold War. It is highly accurate to suggest that the orthodox view of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr, developed because of the attitudes in the West at the time. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, classified archives from the USSR were released. However, prior to this, historians, like Schlesinger, relied heavily on the West for sources relating to the causes of The Cold War. Thus, highlighting the natural bias that may have resulted, as the available archives at the time were placing sole responsibility on the Soviet Union. Additionally, events at the time may have also influenced Schlesinger’s depiction of the USSR. A prime example would be The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, when thousands of protestors demanded freedom from Soviet oppression, resulting in Soviet tanks invading Budapest, crushing the uprising and killing many people. The brutal events of 1956 successfully portrayed the USSR as an authoritarian aggressor to the West, thus justifying Schlesinger’s suggestion that the Soviet Union was absolutely to blame.
Furthermore, the political background of the American historian, Arthur Schlesinger, must also be considered when discussing the reasons for his orthodox interpretation. In 1968, he was an active supporter of John F. Kennedy, whose administration had considerable tensions with the Soviet Union. His relationship with American diplomats, as well as the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963 by Lee Harvey Oswald, a Marxist sympathizer, fuelled his anti-communist beliefs. Therefore, influencing him to view the USSR in a pessimistic light, which is made apparent in his work produced in 1967, Origins of The Cold War.
Gar Alperovitz book, Atomic Diplomacy, was published in 1965, prior to the release of Soviet archives, however, his revisionist approach remains critical towards the USA as he believes their actions caused The Cold War. It is correct to say that Alperovitz view was influenced by events during that time. The failure of U.S. foreign policy resulted in historians reviewing American history far more critically. America’s participation in The Vietnam War (1955-1975) made many people deeply suspicious of the government. Their support of a corrupt regime, fighting against communism resulted in the death of thousands of innocent civilians. Additionally, the huge economic cost generated from the war angered many Americans as they felt neglected by their government. The role of the USA overseas and in global management was now being examined, which led to the questioning of America’s role in The Cold War. Another event that may have influenced Alperovitz interpretation of The Cold War was The Cuban Revolution. Many began debating the U.S. handling of Cuba, arguing that the USA did not have good intentions and were just trying to hinder Soviet progression. These events heavily influenced Alperovitz interpretation as he now viewed the USA’s intention of the atomic bomb as a form of intimidation and aggression towards the USSR.
In addition to this, his political background also played a role in influencing his view on the causes of The Cold War. As a political activist, Alperovitz work centred on alternatives to capitalism, which is at the core of American society. His view of capitalism led him to believe that the bombings of Japan were an attempt to prevent communist expansion in Asia, rather than end the war. Furthermore, Alperovitz was also influenced by William Appleman Williams, a revisionist historian and socialist who held the belief that the USA were more responsible for The Cold War due to their aggressive, empire-building nature.
After the Soviet archives opened to historians in 1991, post-revisionist historians, like John Lewis Gaddis, were able to revise their interpretations. His book The United States and the Origins of The Cold War was published in 1972, prior to the Soviet archives, where he claimed confrontation was inevitable due to the two directly opposing ideologies of the USA and the USSR. As he solely relied on the West for sources, Gaddis did not apportion blame for the origins of The Cold War. However, after the archives were released, it became clear that the USSR played a greater role in rising tensions.
Another factor that heavily influenced the view of Gaddis on the cause of The Cold War was his relationship with American diplomats resulting in a biased view of events. He was a close friend of George F. Kennan, an official at the US embassy in Moscow. Kennan formulated the long telegram in 1946 which stated that the USSR was determined to spread communism and therefore the Soviet Union and the USA could not peacefully co-exist. In addition to this, he advocated a policy of containment to prevent the expansion of communism abroad. Gaddis’ friendship with Kennan influenced his views on the cause of The Cold War as Gaddis would view the relations between Russia and the USA through the eyes of Kennan, thus undermining the role the U.S. played in increasing tensions between the two powers.
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